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Abstract 
The renewal of interest in the European Community in the last ten years has 
sparked a new round of political theorizing to explain European unification. 
Neofunctionalism, an early and influential regional integration theory which was 
discredited during the 1970s is coming back in modified form. One of these new 
theories which builds on neofunctionalism is dialectical functionalism" This paper 
reviews the tenets of neofunctionalism, as well as its shortcomings, then presents 
dialectical functionalism in relation to neofunctionalism. Next, a case study on the 
development of European Community telecommunications policy is presented, then the 
paper concludes with an application of dialectical functionalism to EC 
telecommunications policy. 
This paper is dedicated to the memory of Dr. Vibeke Smensen, Professor of 
International Organizations at the Rijksuniversiteit Groningen in the Netherlands, 
whose guidance was invaluable in the completion of this paper. Her untimely death in 
January 1995 robbed the world of an outstanding scholar and person. 
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After more than a decade of stagnation, the European Community came back to 
life in the mid-1980s. Previously, this great experiment in political and economic 
integration had, with the end of its early supranational successes, come to be 
considered yet another intergovernmental bargaining body on the order of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT). Political scientists, who had devoted a great 
deal of effort to examining and explaining the early steps in European integration, 
realized with the backsliding of the 1970s that their models were flawed, and largely 
turned their attention elsewhere. With its revitalization in the 1980s, the EC once again 
attracted the notice of political scientists, who dusted off the old theories in an attempt 
to explain the new round of integration. In recent years, journals devoted to 
international relations and European politics have bristled with articles trying to 
resuscitate the old theories and proposing new permutations to explain the seemingly 
illogical progress of European integration. 
The search for a new integration theory has at its foundation the conflict 
between the two basic models of the past: neofunctionalism, whose emphasis on 
supranational power and increasing integration formed the predominant theory during 
the EC's successful beginnings in the 196Os; and intergovernmentalism, which cast the 
EC as little more than a negotiating forum for the governments of the member states --
a rather accurate description of the years of "Eurosclerosis" in the 1970s and early 
1980s. Though recent developments in EC politics and policymaking have discredited 
these two basic theories in their original forms, students of the "new" European 
Community have selected elements from and added new considerations to these models 
in order to construct new theories of European integration. Dorette Corbey (1995) has 
proposed one of the new models, which she calls "dialectical functionalism," a theory 
based on neofunctionalism, but with a different analysis of the interactions of major 
actors to account for the stop-and-go nature of integration over the last four decades. 
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'!' Dialectical functionalism will be the framework for analysis in this paper. 
l 
The 1980s have seen a great expansion in the scope of European Community 
competence. For its first two decades the EC concerned itself mostly with the negative 
integrative steps towards completing the customs union, a few substantive programs 
like the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), and its attempts to increase or at least 
maintain its role on the European political stage. By the mid-1980s, most member 
countries were willing to accept that European solutions were needed for the problems 
faced by their economies in an increasingly globalized marketplace. The 1985 White 
Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market and the subsequent Single European 
Act (SEA) represented the emergence of a leading role for the EC in restructuring the 
European economy to finally achieve the goals of the Treaty of Rome. While the EC 
had always primarily been concerned with the European economy, the SEA pushed it 
much farther in the direction of economic union than could have been envisioned only a 
few years before. The White Paper proposed approximately three hundred measures 
that would be necessary to complete the internal market (Pinder, 1993: 53), and when 
the basic plan was codified in the SEA, the EC found itself in a position to exert a great 
deal more influence over economic policy. 
One previously untouched area to which the EC began to turn its attention was 
telecommunications. EC interest in telecommunications began to develop in the early 
1980s -- actuaIJy predating the 1985 White Paper -- after the divestment of AT&T in 
the United States and the liberalization of the telecommunications market in the United 
Kingdom. However these early steps amounted to little more than research on the state 
of the European telecommunications market. It was in 1987, concurrent with the 
adoption of the SEA, that the European Commission released its Green Paper on the 
Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment, which set the 
framework for the EC's subsequent dramatic reforms of the European 
telecommunications market. Liberalization of telecommunications at tht~ hands of the 
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...,..., EC is seen as an integral part of completing the internal market, but the achievement of 
the Commission's goals has not been without problems. Numerous actors have 
developed a keen interest in the sector, and there has been disagreement on the pace 
and necessity of change. This paper will provide a detailed background of the 
development of European Community telecommunications policy and will determine 
whether the assumption of this new responsibility by the EC supports Corbey's model 
of dialectical functionalism. After an outline of neofunctionalist theory and its 
shortcomings, the tenets of dialectical functionalism will be explained, followed by an 
examination of the history of the EC's involvement in the telecommunications field, 
and finally the application of dialectical functionalism to the European 
telecommunications experience. 
l 
Neofunctionalism 
The experiences of the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s with the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and later EURATOM and the European Economic 
Community (EEC) seemed to validate neofunctionalism, which became the prevailing 
integration theory in those years. Its most important feature was the concept of 
spillover, whereby integrative steps at the supranational level would create pressures 
for the integration of other related policy areas. This pressure was created when 
national interest groups, recognizing the superiority of transferring policy competence 
to the supranational level, would pressure the national governments to relinquish their 
sovereignty in those areas. The whole process was fostered by supranational 
leadership, embodied in the European Commission. Through such spillover, power 
and elite loyalty were increasingly transferred to the supranational body in a zero-sum 
game. Significantly, neofunctionalism did not predict a specific end-state for Europe, 
but rather viewed integration as a process (Lodge, 1993: xx-xxi). 
l 
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A major reason for the early acceptance of neofunctionalism was its concern 
with the economic aspects of integration. The architects of the ECSC and the Treaty of 
Rome had envisioned economic integration as the means to the end of political 
integration. In the years following World War II, many European leaders sought to tie 
West Germany and France together economically so that a close partnership would 
develop which would preclude future military aggression. The creation of the ECSC in 
the early 1950s was the first step in this direction, creating a common market for steel 
and coal products -- industries which also had a high political salience in the member 
states. Consistent with the spillover concept, the success of the supranationalization of 
the coal and steel markets showed business elites as well as domestic political elites the 
potential advantages of integration in other areas. The creation of EURATOM and the 
EEC by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 institutionalized these spillover pressures and 
extended integration into nuclear energy and the creation of a customs union, 
respectively. According to neofunctionalism, these new organizations represented the 
recognition that economic efficiency would be increased by coordinating actions and 
policies above the national level. So while economics drove the integration process, 
there were inevitable political externalities to this collective action. 
The surprising speed with which integration began to occur in the early 1960s 
seemed to support neofunctionalism, but its theoretical tidiness was not a concern of 
Charles de Gaulle, who felt that integration was going too far too fast. The 1965 crisis 
which de Gaulle precipitated, followed by the Luxembourg Compromise, substantially 
changed the course of the EC' s development and was an event which simply had no 
place within the construct of neofunctionalism. There was no room in the model for 
regression, and the concerns of domestic governments about retaining sovereignty were 
much stronger than neofunctionalists had expected. According to neofunc:tionalism, the 
united forces of the Commission and the mobilized national interest groups should have 
overpowered the national governments, but in truth the political spillover pressures 
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"I' which came with the economic integration caused a backlash on the national level, and 
the fact that a single national leader could not only halt but reverse the integration 
process proved fatal to neofunctionalism. 
l 
Although Ernst Haas, the man credited with launching neofunctionalism in the 
1950s, had by 1975 recanted the theory as an inaccurate representation of European 
integration, neofunctionalism I s central tenets have continued to inform analysis of 
integration to the present day, and indeed some authors (George, 1991; Mutimer, 1989) 
have attempted to revive the theory in light of the recent renewal of integration in the 
EC. However, even these supporters recognize the flaws of neofunctionalism in its 
original conception, and have proposed a variety of changes and extensions. The 
universal criticism of neofunctionalism is its neglect of the role of domestic 
governments. Neofunctionalism ignores the truism that no person or organization gives 
up power voluntarily: the theory of spillover posits that under pressure from interest 
groups and the supranational body, national governments realize the benefits of ceding 
their power, and do so voluntarily. The assumption is that efficiency is the ultimate 
goal of all three actors, but it ignores the fact that efficiency may become only a 
secondary goal if a national government feels its authority to decide the most efficient 
course of action is being challenged. In any system where the member states retain the 
power, even if outside accepted channels, to unilaterally block the functioning of the 
supranational body, national governments must be included as part of the equation of 
integration. 
Another criticism of neofunctionalism is that it assumes the process of 
integration occurs in a vacuum; the influence of countries outside the integrating unit as 
well as the condition of the world economy is disregarded. George (1991) and Corbey 
(1995) both cast international factors as catalysts for both EC and member state actions. 
For example, the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system caused member nations to 
seek currency stability in the European Monetary System (EMS). Had the United 
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"'T' States not dismantled Bretton Woods, there would have been little impetus for the 
European nations to try to coordinate monetary policy at the European level. 
Similarly, the relative decline of Europe within a rapidly changing global economic 
environment during the 1980s made the ambitious measures of the SEA appear 
necessary to the member governments. On the other hand, external factors can also 
impede integration. The powerful influence of the United States over Western Europe 
during the Cold War played a large part in convincing de Gaulle to break with the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and stall European integration in order to 
maintain an independent position for France in world affairs. Thus, while external 
factors do not directly affect the process of integration, they do provide a stimulus for 
member governments, the Commission, and interest groups to tum their attention 
toward particular issues and problems. 
l 
A final shortcoming of neofunctionalism identified by George (1991) and 
related to the preceding point is that it is predicated on steady economic expansion 
within the member countries. As long as economic fortunes continue to be favorable, 
individual states will be more willing to experiment with the transfer of economic 
policy power to the supranational level. In times of economic downturn, however, 
states tend to become more protectionist in order to shelter their own economies; in 
such times, national governments want to have as many options as possible, so the 
transfer of power in a specific area to the supranational body becomes anathema. The 
first two decades of the EC illustrate this problem quite well. The 1960s was a decade 
of growth for the Western European economies, which by then had largely recovered 
from World War II. Those years also coincided with the rapid development of power 
in Brussels, and the EC's reversal of fortune in the late 1960s was due to political, not 
economic considerations. The 1970s were, in contrast, a time of economic stagnation 
and were the time of acute Eurosclerosis, when the EC was disregarded as member 
states pursued national solutions to their economic problems. The 1970s taught the 
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l' 
I 
l 
and thus one of the basic assumptions of neofunctionalism was erroneous. 
The intergovernmentalist scholars who displaced the neofunctionalists In the 
1970s based their model of the Ee on the paramount importance of the member 
governments, assigning a secondary role to national interest groups, and generally 
disregarding supranational leadership. Like neofunctionalism in the 1960s, 
intergovernmental ism accurately explained the situation at the time, but like 
neofunctionali sm, intergovernmentalism in its original form became obsolete as the 
dynamics of European integration changed once again. This theoretical casting about 
highlights a troubling methodological problem the Ee presents. The Ee as a 
supranational organization with sovereign powers is unique. Political theorists, 
especially those in the 1960s, had to base their theorizing on an organization barely a 
decade old and without any equivalent. Deriving a parsimonious, generalizable theory 
from the observation of one subject is risky business in any science, yet that is exactly 
what integration theorists have had to do. Now, as the Treaty of Rome approaches its 
fortieth birthday, comparative study is still impossible, but a chronological approach is 
becoming feasible. Fostered both by the new livelihood of the Ee and by the benefit 
of increased hindsight, European integration is once again fertile ground for theorizing. 
Dialectical Functionalsim 
Among the numerous new theories of European integration is a model proposed 
by Dorette Corbey in the Spring 1995 issue of International Organization, called 
"dialectical functionalism." Explicitly based on neofunctionalism, this new theory 
attempts to correct the flaws of neofunctionalism, while adding a longer time horizon to 
the spillover concept, allowing room for action (integration) and reaction (stagnation), 
hence the term "dialectical." As such, it constitutes a refinement of neofunctionalism 
made possible by the Ee's advancing age. The dialectical process, as history shows, 
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Therefore, neofunctionalism was not wrong, according to dialectical functionalism, just 
naive, based on incomplete information. The major differences from neofunctionalism 
are the following 
• Dialectical functionalism rejects neofunctionalism I s widely criticized neglect of the 
national governments in the integration process. Instead, it posits a significant role 
for all three major actors -- supranational institutions, national interest groups, and 
national governments -- and a new dynamic of interaction between them. 
• In dialectical functionalism, the spillover process is not continuous, as In 
neofunctionalism. Each step of integration provokes a reaction in the national 
governments against the supranational body, resulting in stagnation. 
• In contrast to the neofunctionalist view, the cumulative transfer of sovereignty to 
the supranational entity does not make the nation-state obsolete, but rather increases 
its role in mediating between competing interest groups. 
Corbey summarizes the dialectical process in six steps -- three relating to national 
government action: 
1. Integration in one policy area leads member states to safeguard adjacent 
policy areas against EU impact and to protect formal national autonomy. 
2. In adjacent areas, government intervention and, in time, polic:y competition 
Increase. 
3. When state intervention (or policy rivalry) in these neighboring areas 
becomes counterproductive, policy preferences converge and further 
integration is demanded by the member states, or they agree to integration 
supplied by the European Commission, or both. (p. 265) 
And three detailing the role of interest groups: 
4. Interest groups finding their position impaired by integration direct their 
demands toward the European level; since the same interests are affected in 
all member states, transnational coalitions come about. 
5. Integration stirs domestic power relations: interest groups that are or that 
become active in adjacent areas can improve their position. They direct 
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their demands at the national government. Where these groups defend 
opposing interests, national bargaining comes into play. 
6. The renewed participation of groups in adjacent areas will result in 
disturbing governments, as such participation leads to stagnation in the new 
policy sectors. To promote change, governments turn toward the EU. 
(p. 268) 
An illustration from international trade demonstrates the reaction of 
governments to integration. When the GATT began to exert its power by multilaterally 
lowering tariffs, national governments were deprived of a policy instrument. So that 
they could still control their foreign trade flows, even while agreeing ideologically with 
the GAIT tariff reductions, many countries developed a variety of non-tariff barriers, 
which were not covered by the GAIT agreement. In such a situation, the gains from 
free trade are quickly nullified by unilateral action. According to dialectical 
functionalism, each country will build up a similar non-tariff fortification so that no 
country will ultimately gain from its own protectionist measures. At this point, states 
will appeal to the GAIT organization to make new rules eliminating non-tariff barriers, 
marking the return of supranational integration. Yet, once again, individual countries 
have lost another policy instrument, so the process begins again. This is the essence of 
dialectical functionalism, and this focus on the process of integration without 
determining an end-state is a characteristic it shares with neofunctionalism. Spillover 
does indeed occur in this example; however, it is not a steady, continuous process as 
neofunctionalism would suggest. There is a long period of stagnation before the next 
integrative step is taken. Furthermore, this example illustrates that the role of the 
national governments does not diminish, since major policy decisions continue to be 
made at the national level in order to maximize movement within an increasingly 
restrictive set of multilateral rules. 
Unlike neofunctionalism, dialectical functionalism attaches importance to 
international factors. However, the role of the global environment is merely catalytic; 
it does not affect the process of integration. That is, changes in the global environment 
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"I can, and often do highlight the inefficiencies of following national strategies, and thus 
spur national governments or interest groups to call for integration. So international 
factors can determine when, but not how integration will occur. 
l 
The role of the supranational actor in dialectical functionalism is more nuanced 
than in neofunctionalism. While in neofunctionalism the supranational body takes a 
proactive approach to increasing its power by courting interest groups and being an 
initiator of the integration process, dialectical functionalism sees its role as more of a 
forum for consensus-building. It makes its proposals based on a knowledge of the 
needs and wants of the other actors and always remains prepared to take the reins of 
power when a stagnation period suddenly comes to an end and the call for integration 
comes forth once again. 
Taken as a whole, dialectical functionalism represents a new dynamic in actor 
interaction, offering an alternative to what is generally considered the weakest part of 
neofunctionalism. The national governments, interest groups, and supranational 
organizations all play an important role in the process of integration. Dialectical 
functionalism also embraces the concept of spillover, though the integration/stagnation 
dialectic impedes the smooth progress of integration. Finally, since the nation-state 
maintains an important place within the system, the transfer of sovereignty to a 
supranational body is not a zero-sum game, as it is in neofunctionalism. The next 
section will discuss the development of the Ee's telecommunications policy from a 
historical perspective, after which dialectical functionalism will be applied to the 
experience of telecom deregulation. 
The Development of a European Telecommunications Policy 
From the time of the invention of the telegraph and the telephone, the operation 
of telecommunications systems was considered a public utility. Monopoly powers were 
given to state agencies or regulated companies for the provision of all aspects of 
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telecommunications servIceS. The rationale was twofold: first, economIC thought 
determined that the telecommunications infrastructure was a natural monopoly, so free-
market competition would reduce efficiency and raise costs. Second, regulated 
monopolies allowed governments to provide the social and political goal of universal 
service at affordable prices. However, regulation was necessary, because it was 
recognized that Ita monopoly supplier will have few incentives to minimise costs, to 
adapt rapidly to new technologies or to set prices in such a way as to combine 
economic efficiency and social equity" (Ergas, 1987). To counteract this tendency, 
regulatory bodies attempted to provide incentives for efficient operation of the 
infrastructure, to prevent the abuse of monopoly power, to limit political interference, 
and to allow the flexibility to adapt to changes in the market. However, evidence 
suggests that regulation of monopolies had great difficulty in achieving these goals 
(Ergas, 1987). 
At the end of the 1970s, this mounting evidence prompted governments to reas-
sess the role of government control of certain sectors of the economy. After the 
economic malaise of the previous decade, governments saw in privatization and 
deregulation the opportunity to raise the efficiency of their economies, enhance their 
global competitiveness, reduce the size of the public sector, and thus provide budgetary 
relief (Stevens, 1992). 
In the telecommunications sector, the United States, Japan, and Great Britain 
instituted reforms in the early 1980s which broke the historical monopolies of the 
institutions which had controlled the communications infrastructures within their coun-
tries. These measures were enacted in recognition of the rapid growth of the 
telecommunications sector, whose revenues in 1991 were expanding at 10-15% per 
year (Moore, 1992); the importance to the national economies of developing a modem 
infrastructure; and the competitive advantages conferred on firms with access to 
advanced services, which the telecoms were slow to introduce (Sandholtz, 1993). 
l 
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Recognizing the possibility that Europe could easily be left behind in the 
telecommunications race, the Commission of the EC began to take notice. A report 
published in 1983 on the state of telecommunications within the Community found its 
performance, especially in open markets, to be relatively poor (Locksley, 1983). 
However, the European telecommunications market was inherently different from those 
of the United States or Japan. Within the Community, there were twelve autonomous 
national systems which were technically incompatible, offered differing services and 
equipment, and had varying tariff structures. This was because in each member state 
(with the exception of Great Britain) all aspects of national telecommunications were 
still controlled by the entrenched telecoms. This meant that telecoms operated in 
closed markets, where they were the exclusive sources of terminal equipment (any 
appliance, such as a telephone or facsimile machine, which is connected to the 
network) and purchased all their equipment from one or two national suppliers 
(Sandholtz, 1993). 
After the 1987 adoption of the SEA, the Commission began to take concrete 
action to break down the old system and introduce competition and compatibility into 
the wider European market. This action was stimulated not only by the necessity of a 
liberalized telecommunications structure for the proper functioning of the internal 
market, but also by the benefits which were already to be seen from the recent 
deregulation in the US, Japan and Britain, as well as the influence of neoclassical 
economics, which advocated a return to free-market principles (Knieps, 1989). The 
relative backwardness of the European market was illustrated by some striking sta-
tistics: 
- The per capita investment in telecommunications in the Community was only 
40% of that in the US. 
- Only half as many telephones were in use in European businesses as in US 
businesses. 
T 
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- In the early 1980s, telecommunications equipment in Europe was 80%-100% 
more expensive than in the US (Almeida, 1987). 
Further impetus came from two major interest groups within the Community. 
The first were the major producers of telecoms equipment. Though they had been 
treated to assured markets under the old public procurement regimes, they were 
becoming increasingly aware that they needed access to Community-wide markets in 
order to remain globally competitive, and thus desired a standardization of technical 
specifications. The second group was the users and providers of advanced telecom-
munications services. As a result of deregulation in the US and Japan, companies there 
were now able to make use of highly customized telecommunications systems, 
including cutting-edge technological developments, which put them at a distinct 
competitive advantage over European companies (Sandholtz, 1993). 
In 1987, as a result of these pressures, the Commission issued its milestone 
"Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Telecom Services and 
Equipment. " This document was to serve as the blueprint for the Commission r s 
telecom liberalization strategy. The Commission stated the overall goals of the Green 
Paper as follows: 
The aim of the Green Paper is to bring about a more coherent framework in the 
ongoing regulatory change to encourage the development of new services in a 
more competitive framework, and to establish (and utilize politically, for 
example in international trade negotiations) a wider European Market for 
telecommunications services. (Mueller, 1988) 
The major recommendations were sweepmg: the total deregulation of the 
markets for terminal equipment and II enhanced telecommunications services, II the 
liberalization of public procurement practices by the national telecoms, and a multilate-
ral effort towards technical standardization within the Community. Monopolies were to 
be kept, however, on the network infrastructures, and on basic services such as voice 
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"'1'" telephony, subject to periodic public interest investigations (Knieps, 1989, and Scherer, 
1993). 
l 
These recommendations served not only the interests of the outside groups, but 
also were seen as necessary by the Commission in achieving its own long-range goals. 
First, the unavailability of advanced telecommunications services across borders was an 
impediment to the successful completion of the internal market and contrary to the free 
movement principles strongly advocated by the Commission. Second, the national 
markets for certain telecom sectors were too small to support competition; the existence 
of a unified European telecommunications market would allow for competition in all 
sectors. Third, a true and effective regional market required universal standards, so 
that equipment and services would be compatible throughout the Community. And 
fourth, unified standards required joint research and planning for future integrated 
digital networks, as well as the adoption of new technologies (Sandholtz, 1993). All of 
these problems needed to be surmounted as part of the Commission's internal market 
program. 
Since Community policy making has historically been an arduous affair 
consisting of deal-making, concessions, and ultimately "lowest common denominator" 
policy outputs, it is not surprising that these recommendations met with some initial 
resistance from the member states -- especially considering that the proposals directly 
threatened the long-established, powerful telecoms. Yet by the late 1980s, the rapid 
development of information technologies coupled with the clear success of other 
deregulation schemes made even the telecoms realize that change was necessary. Thus, 
member states voluntarily transferred regulatory powers to the Commission, with the 
national telecoms agreeing to the consequent liberalization of their markets in return for 
the benefits they realized collective action would bring. Sandholtz (1993) identifies 
two conditions necessary for collective action of this type: adaptation on the national 
level and international leadership. The national governments and telecoms had, even 
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discuss unilateral liberalization measures. With the entry of the Commission, the 
necessary intemationalleadership was introduced, and the Commission was able to pull 
the telecoms through its own deregulation plan, which was generally more ambitious 
than anything which had been proposed at the national level. 
1 
However, in its Green Paper, the Commission stopped short of recommending 
the total elimination of monopoly practices, allowing the telecoms to retain their 
control of basic services, most significantly, voice telephony, which was narrowly 
defined by the Commission as "the commercial provision for the public of direct 
transmission of speech in real time" (Dommering, 1993). This is largely attributable to 
the continued conflict between liberalization and universal service. In the words of 
Knieps (1989), the deregulation experiences in the US, Japan, and Britain had shown 
that "equity considerations in the form of socially desired infrastructure objectives may 
strongly influence the course of the deregulation process in the telecommunications 
sector." 
There was still a large degree of debate on reconciling these two seemingly 
contradictory goals. Universal service, as defined by the Commission, is the right for 
all customers to have a telephone connected, to be able to utilize services meeting 
universally defined quality standards, and to progressively have access to a range of 
new services (I&T Ma.gazine News Review, 1993). The Commission's solution to the 
conundrum of assuring these rights in the face of unregulated competition was to retain 
the traditional status of the telecoms as utility providers in the area of basic services. 
Nevertheless, progress was made in restricting the telecoms' abuse of their dominant 
positions in these markets. The Commission promulgated rules against restrictions on 
the provision of basic services, arrangements tying provision of monopoly services to 
the supply of equipment, and perhaps most importantly, the cross-subsidization of 
competitive services by revenues generated from monopoly services (Scherer, 1993). 
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an issue which has perplexed regulatory bodies for years. It is the practice of 
overcharging for services on long-distance and international service to make up for the 
losses incurred in providing inherently unprofitable local service. Because of universal 
service objectives, regulatory bodies have mandated an equalization of local phone rates 
regardless of geographical circumstances. Thus local rates are often below the cost of 
the service, especially in rural or remote areas. In recent years cross-subsidization has 
increased because new technology has greatly reduced the cost of long-distance and 
international calls, though the same technology has not helped local service (Knieps, 
1989). The scope of the practice is huge -- the Commission estimates that as much as 
sixteen billion Ecu per year is transferred by European telecoms from long-distance 
services to cover the losses from local services, as well as operator assistance, 
emergency services, and so forth (J&T Magazine News Review, 1993). Because the 
rates of long-distance calls are so far above their costs, they are tremendously 
profitable, which can lead to the phenomenon of "cream skimming;" if competition is 
allowed in long-distance while the telecoms are still obligated to local service by 
universal service requirements, long-distance revenue will be lost to private long-
distance companies, putting the telecoms into a legally mandated loss situation. So that 
cream skimming does not occur -- as would be possible in the Community's rubric --
some regulation continues to be necessary, especially since total deregulation would 
lead to politically problematic price increases for local service (Mueller, 1989). 
In proposing concrete solutions for the theoretical quagmires of universal 
service and cross-subsidization, the Commission established in its 1987 Green Paper a 
coherent regulatory framework for the European telecommunications market, a 
considerable accomplishment, in view of the fact that telecommunications policy had 
not been an area of Community competence until that time. And since 1987, the 
Commission has continued to be ahead of the national telecoms and the member states 
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....,.... in its drive towards liberalization (Sandholtz, 1993). There are now two main sources 
of authority for European Community involvement in telecommunications regulation. 
First, Article 100a of the EC Treaty is the basis of Council of Ministers directives, 
requiring qualified majority adoption, of Commission proposals to effect the 
approximation of national laws to help establish the internal market. Since telecom 
liberalization is central to the Commission's overall internal market plan, all 
Community telecommunications policy may be justified under Article 100a. 
Furthermore, under Article 90(3), the Commission has the power to address directives 
or decisions directly to member states to assure that national telecommunications laws 
do not conflict with the EC Treaty. The Commission has used this procedure in the 
past, effectively" forcing the Council's hand," and meeting with great displeasure from 
some member states (Scherer, 1993), who have challenged the Commission's authority 
to issue specific directives on telecom liberalization. The European Court of Justice, 
however, has largely upheld the Commission's power in these cases (Scherer, 1993; 
Damton and Wuersch, 1992). Using its powers derived from the EC Treaty, the 
Commission has developed a four-point program which guides Community policy. The 
Community now sponsors an extensive coordinated research program for new 
telecommunications technology, the common development of a modem digital 
information infrastructure, the opening of markets in equipment and services, and the 
joint management of technical standardization and planning (Sandholtz, 1993). 
Within the last three years, the Commission has pushed even further, creating 
an official list of "basic" network services (local telephone, telex, and data 
transmission) which may remam monopoly-controlled, working towards the 
universalization of tariff structures for private networks, and abolishing the practice of 
cross-subsidization between telecoms and postal services (Capello and Nijkamp, 1992). 
And in 1993, the Commission reached an agreement with the member states to 
l 
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completely open the market in voice telephony, including local service, by 1998 (l&T 
Magazine News Review, 1994). 
Clearly, the European telecommunications sector, which Capello and Nijkamp 
(1992) say "is in the vanguard of the establishment of an internal market," has been 
greatly affected in a short period of time by the institutions of the European 
Community. Whereas only ten years ago national telecoms still tightly controlled their 
sacrosanct fiefdoms, the European market is now quickly regaining ground lost to the 
deregulated US and Japanese markets. Although the reforms are not yet concluded, the 
speed and success of the changes in telecom regulation can be considered "a major 
political achievement of the Commission" (Sandholtz, 1993). Indeed, Sandholtz sums 
up the Commission's performance with laudatory words: 
The core of the Commission's plan for liberalizing telecoms markets survived 
the battles intact. The Commission initiated the proposals for market opening, 
set the agenda for Community deliberations, and pushed for the approval of 
specific directives. In every instance, the Commission was ahead of the 
member states in its objectives for EC-Ievel reforms; in many instances 
Commission proposals had to overcome the resistance of major member states. 
The result is that the Commission now has a more solid grasp than it began with 
on independent powers to open telecoms markets to competition. 
Thus, the success of European Community telecommunications policy has not 
only meant the improvement of services for network customers, it has also become a 
feather in the Commission's cap. And in the long term, it is likely to help keep 
European business and industry competitive in the global market, as well as facilitate 
what is perhaps the Commission's ultimate goal, the completion of the European 
internal market. 
Dialectical Functionalism and European Community Telecommunications Policy 
The liberalization of telecommunications in the EC is a clear case of economic 
integration. Before 1983, telephone services were entirely the province of national 
---,---------_._------------
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""I. governments and their affiliated Postal, Telephone and Telegraph Administrations 
(PTTs); the EC had absolutely no competence in the area of telecommunications. In 
only four years, the EC went from bystander to policy leader and in the past eight years 
has largely transformed its blueprint laid out in the 1987 Green Paper into reality. 
"I .. 
! 
l 
PITs which had been powerful state monopolies were converted in under ten years into 
private corporations subject to competition from the likes of AT&T. A complex 
interplay of factors and actors caused this shift of policy making authority, in a process 
which reflects the predictions of dialectical functionalism. 
The major departure from dialectical functionalism in the telecom case is the 
origin of the national protectionism. Telecommunications, as discussed in the previous 
section, had historically been considered a natural monopoly, so the usual solution was 
to organize a state-run monopoly. In the European countries, the telecoms became 
large, entrenched political entities, as well as business concerns, which governments 
saw as strategic for national security. For these reasons, the countries of the EC 
entered the 1980s with the old system intact and no intention of allowing competition, 
much less control over their telecoms by the Commission. With the progress of 
technology and the increasing competitiveness of the US and British 
telecommunications giants, national policies were becoming counterproductive, as the 
dialectical functionalist model would indicate, but the national protection of telecoms 
was not a reaction to a previous integrative step. Nevertheless, many of the other 
forces depicted in the dialectical functionalist model were present. 
The main catalyst for change was external factors. The model says that outside 
influences can reveal the inefficiencies of the national systems, and in this case 
technological convergence and the opening of other markets to competition exposed the 
disadvantages of the fragmented European system. Had electronic technology remained 
static and had the United States retained its regulated monopoly arrangement, there 
would have been no impetus to change the European system that had successfully 
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operated in such an environment for nearly a century. But these important external 
developments forced Europeans to start examining and questioning the appropriateness 
of the existing arrangement. 
The changing international environment caused all three sets of actors to take 
note of this new problem. The Commission, recognizing the importance of 
communication in the internal market, began collecting information on the state of the 
telecommunications market and drafting proposals on making Europe more competitive 
internationally through telecom liberalization. The Commission very quickly became 
an expert on telecommunications issues, and was able to convert that expertise into 
policy leadership when it was needed. As the model would predict, the Commission 
consulted the affected interest groups as well as the national governments in its 
preparation for the release of the Green Paper. Some national governments also began 
taking measures unilaterally as in the radical reforms in Britain, or the studies on 
I' : liberalization in the Netherlands. 
l 
Finally, interest groups such as business associations and equipment producers 
began to lobby for liberalization. Interest group competition was to be found on the 
national level, as those groups which stood to benefit from lower prices and open 
markets competed with those interested in preserving the monopolies, consisting mainly 
of PTT employees and their political allies. National governments caught in the 
crossfire were in a difficult position, recognizing the benefits national industry would 
derive from the liberalization of the telecommunications market, but at the same time 
beholden to the large electoral bloc the telecom employees and their families 
represented. The entry of the EC into the fray in support of the business interests 
relieved the national governments of the need to decide which of the powerful groups 
would have to be forsaken; in this case the national governments actually derived a 
benefit from relinquishing national control over telecommunications policy, which 
allowed them to drop a long-standing but now counterproductive policy with a 
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....,..., mInImUm of political damage. This situation mIrrors the portion of the dialectical 
functionalist model concerned with interest group competition. 
l 
In the end, the Commission forged a general consensus around its liberalization 
proposals. Even in the European Court of Justice cases filed against the Commission 
for issuing directives on liberalization based on Article 90 of the EC Treaty, the 
plaintiffs challenged not the content of the directives, but only the Commission's legal 
authority to issue them (Darnton and Wuersch, 1992). And understandably, in a sector 
whose traditional structure has been greatly altered in such a short time, there has been 
some institutional inertia in countries like Belgium and France. All actors involved, 
including the PITs themselves, now recognize the need for change to accommodate the 
changing technology, as well as to permit European companies to compete on equal 
footing with their rivals in the United States and Japan. The disagreements come not 
over the necessity for change, but rather over questions of pace and scope. And these 
differences are acceptable within dialectical functionalism; what is most important is 
that integration has occurred and the EC is now the primary policy maker and interest 
aggregator in a sector that only fifteen years ago was the solely the prerogative of 
national governments. 
The failure of national telecommunications policies was not a result of the 
dialectical process; the orthodoxy of natural monopoly and universal service 
requirements had shaped the structure which had acceptably governed the 
telecommunications industry in Europe until only recently. These ultimately 
counterproductive national policies were not a defensive reaction to prior integration, as 
dialectical functionalism would predict. They were instead rendered counterproductive 
by changes in the global environment. With the recognition of the need for change, the 
Commission began to develop its competence in telecommunications policy, interest 
groups competed at the national level to further their individual goals, and national 
governments began to study and even act on liberalization pressures. Eventually it 
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.....,...- became clear that the EC was the proper locus for the most efficient solution, and 
member governments, seeking relief from the difficult coalitional conflicts at the 
national level, granted the EC the authority it needed to coordinate the reforms. Thus, 
integration occurred in accordance with the predictions of dialectical functionalism. 
l 
Conclusion 
The development of a European telecommunications policy should be seen in 
the larger context of the internal market reforms embodied in the Single European Act. 
It is unlikely that the liberalization of the telecommunications market could have 
occurred so quickly and decisively if there had not been agreement on the general goal 
of completing the internal market. The overall ideological shift in Europe towards 
liberalism has elevated economic efficiency to the top priority, and the interests of 
standardization and scale have made the European Community a natural location for 
economic policymaking. Ironically, the same national political leaders who strive for 
efficiency are often also the strongest advocates of national sovereignty. Dialectical 
functionalism, in the tradition of neofunctionalism, sees these two principles as 
incompatible in the long term: economic integration occurs as a result of the 
inefficiency of varying national policies. The overall fragmentation of the European 
market came to be seen as a handicap to European economies in the 1980s vis-a-vis the 
large integrated markets of the United States and Japan. The internal market reforms 
are intended to create out of the fifteen member states one homogeneous market, and 
the new telecommunications policy is only a part of the larger program. Nevertheless, 
telecommunications constitutes a unique case because of the history of state monopoly 
control, and presents an excellent illustration of dialectical functionalism at work. 
Like neofunctionalism, dialectical functionalism identifies integration as an 
ongomg process. The integration of telecommunications policy should then be 
expected to produce a reaction by member governments to protect their policy power in 
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-r areas adjacent to telecommunications. The Commission has been thorough in the 
coverage of its reforms, so national governments may have difficulty finding related 
areas to fortify against EC incursion. If the time element of dialectical functionalism is 
I' 
I 
correct, however, such a reaction must occur, in order to continue the integrative 
process. The next decade will show whether the EC reforms have been successful, and 
will indicate whether the reaction/ stagnation phase predicted by dialectical 
functionalism will in fact occur, for only with the passage of time can theories of 
European integration be tested. Nevertheless, based on what is now known about the 
short history of European integration, dialectical functionalism holds considerable 
promIse. 
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